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“No pain, no gain,” runs the fitness mantra.
Connecticut has endured plenty of pain since the
sneak attack on State revenues three years ago (see
the Winter and Fall 2002 issues).  Taxes have risen.
Programs have been cut.  State workers have suf-
fered layoffs or deferred raises.  The State’s debt has
waxed while its bond rating has waned. And still we
face a projected deficit of $41 million (Budget
Director Marc Ryan) or $85 million (Comptroller
Nancy Wyman) this fiscal year, and of some $200
million next year, according to the Fiscal Survey of
the States: December 2003.
What about gain?  In hindsight it is clear that
Connecticut—like many other states—wasn’t ade-
quately prepared for the extreme volatility of State
revenues growing out of the recession and stock-
market meltdown of 2000-2001.  Will we be better
prepared for the next crunch?  The current preoccu-
pation over whether to impeach the Governor may
not conduce to sober improvements in the State’s
fiscal fitness.  But the task is too important to put
off for very long.
Live by the Sword…
Connecticut, with its shiny new income tax
adopted in 1991 to help solve the last budget crisis,
rode the roller coaster of capital gains and losses
spawned by the bull-then-bear stock markets of
1995-2002 and the recent recession.  The ride up
was so exhilarating that we forgot how terrifying
the ride down could be.  From FY 1997 through FY
2001, actual general fund revenues exceeded those
budgeted by an average of $646 million per year in
current prices.  But FY 2002 saw a shortfall of $1.1
billion—a net year-over-year swing of some $1.8
billion—about 15% of general fund outlays.
General fund revenues, which soared by 8.5% in
FY 2000 and 7.1% in FY 2001, plummeted by 7.5%
in FY 2002—a full 25% more than the average
drop for states of 6%.
Fortunately, the wild ride of State revenues was
not matched on the spending side of the budget.
The constitutional spending cap approved by vot-
ers in 1992 provided an anchor slowing the growth
of general fund expenditures.  The December 2003
state fiscal survey cited earlier shows Connecticut
among the tighter-fisted states in spending growth
during the go-go years after 1995.  Even when we
did join the party, in FY 2000 and FY 2001, our
growth rates of 6%+ per year remained below the
all-state average of some 8%.
Projections of FY 2005 state budget deficits by
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in
Washington, DC, show Connecticut in a cluster of
21 states (including the District of Columbia) with
projected deficits of “only” 3% or less of general
fund expenditures.  If the pain of others helps con-
sole us in wrestling with our lingering 2% prob-
lem, the other 30 states are in more serious trou-
ble, with some projected shortfalls (in Alaska and
California) over 21%.  So Connecticut, if not out of
the woods of its latest fiscal crisis, seems at least
able to see some clear sky at the edge of the trees.
How’d we get from deficits of a billion dollars or
more a few short years ago to a “mere” several
hundred million today?  Surprise!  Through spend-
ing cuts, increased taxes—and (of late) upticks in
tax revenues due to the economic recovery.  Oh,
yes, and by borrowing—that is, increasing State
debt.  More debt by any other name, even
“Economic Recovery Notes,” boosts interest costs
and threatens the State’s bond rating: The three
top rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) have
all stuck red flags on the map next to
“Connecticut.”  
“We have met the problem and it is us”
Pogo Possum’s old dictum, in Walt Kelly’s comic
strip, was about pollution in the Okefenokee
Swamp, but it applies with equal force to fixing
budget policy in Connecticut.  The political
process, of course, is the ultimate source of all that
happens in the public life of a state.  In the current
crisis, Connecticut politicians arrived at spending
cuts and tax hikes; they also resisted relaxing the
spending cap.  
Heroism comes easiest, of course, under duress.
The same politicians who bravely voted for higher
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taxes and lower spending in the face of a billion-
dollar deficit may be the ones all too easily tempt-
ed in good times to tax and spend (if they’re
Democrats) or the opposite (if they’re
Republicans).  And we the people elect them.
Which is probably why state constitutions and
law codes all across America are loaded with
devices meant to protect politicians and voters
from their own worst instincts, as well as against
economic shocks.  It’s typically harder to change a
fire-wall law than to pass an overly generous bud-
get (late at night) when the money’s there.  And
it’s even harder to change the constitution.
Connecticut has in place three such devices, two of
them constitutional, the third statutory.  How well
have they worked in the last few years, and can we
make them better?
Three Ways to Save Us from Ourselves
1. Bans on state deficits are near-universal—only
Vermont and Indiana rely totally on the political
process to balance their budgets.  But, as Bill
Clinton might have put it, define “deficit”.  We may
prohibit the adoption of budgets that explicitly
incoporate deficit spending, but changes in rev-
enues or spending occur continuously during the
budget year.  Indeed, a ban on projected deficits
may simply encourage politicians to postpone hard
budget decisions till after a “budget” is passed.  In
Connecticut, Governor Rowland cites mid-budget
“customary deficiency spending” adjustments as
justification for routinely requesting expenditures
below the State’s “cap” (see #2 below).  
Why not simply ban state borrowing?  Because
then you’d need to figure out some way to finance
capital projects like new schools.  And then some
way to tighten the definition of “capital”.  And
then… At bottom, constitutional bans on deficits
are mostly hortatory: Go forth and do good.
2. “Thank goodness for the spending cap,” runs
a header in the Governor’s proposed budget for the
current biennium.  The state’s constitutional
spending cap, which limits the annual growth rate
of spending to a 5-year moving average of state
personal income growth, has held down spending
growth, as noted earlier.  Interestingly, the cap
worked because of politics:  The Governor was
able, when leaders of both parties legally overrode
the cap in the late 1990s, to exclude the extra out-
lays from the spending base.   But the cap may
prove awkward as the State works its way out of
the current crisis.
The cap ties spending growth to lagged income
growth.  Thus, as economic growth and stock-mar-
ket recovery undo the revenue crunch, our past
success in slowing the growth of spending will,
under the cap, hold future budgeted spending well
below the so-called “current-services” level—just
carrying out the laws now on the books.  The solu-
tion—an agreement between the General Assembly
and the Governor to exceed the cap and to put
some or all of the excess into the base—may have
to wait until the impeachment process now under-
way works itself out.  State leaders would do well,
when they do get around to it, to rethink certain
structural problems with the cap, such as the disin-
centive to apply for Federal grants inherent in
counting Federal aid dollars in the spending base.
3.  All but three states had “rainy-day funds
(RDFs) on the books as the tsunami of red ink
began to swell in 2001.  In 1985, only 23 states had
RDFs—revenue cushions officially called “budget
stabilization funds”—and 12 states had added
them by 1990.  Connecticut’s not atypical version
provides for (a) putting any State budget surpluses
into the RDF, but only up to a maximum of 5% of
current expenditures; and (b) mandatory use of the
funds to cover any deficits (but only for spending
already authorized).  The State’s RDF was full
going into FY 2002, but the huge revenue swing
swamped the paltry 5% available.  Even some
states with larger RDFs burned through them
rapidly in FY 2002 and FY 2003.
Yet contrary to popular perceptions, state govern-
ments’ reserves were larger in relative terms in the
latest revenue crisis than in earlier ones.  RDFs are
in fact just one form of reserve funds.  During the
flush revenue years, states (Connecticut included)
also retired debt and used surpluses to fund capital
projects or one-time outlays.  (In a sense, cutting
taxes—which Connecticut and many other states
did—is also a form of budget reserves, albeit one
requiring political action to enact.)  Gonzalez and
Levinson, writing in State Tax Notes, August 11,
2003, found that total state budget savings reached
“unprecedented levels in recent years.”
An interesting question is whether the growth of
RDFs noted above simply substituted for other
forms of state reserves, or instead helped increase
total savings, thus enabling states to better cope
with the sharp decline in revenues.  Gonzalez and
Levinson found that the expansion of RDFs con-
tributed significantly to the marked increase in
state reserves; and further, that those savings were
large relative to the normal swings in state budget
cycles.  Their results corroborate the view that the
states as a group, Connecticut among them, were
actually fiscally prudent, or at worst not all that
imprudent, during the binge years preceding the
latest crisis. (A contrary view by Thomas A.
Garrett appeared in the November 2003 issue of
National Economic Trends, published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.)
Still, there may be room for improvement.  Our
fearless leaders could consider modifying the RDF
along the following lines:
◆Redefine the RDF to incorporate all State bud-
get reserves.
◆Mandate minimum contributions to the RDF as
part of total spending, not whatever surpluses hap-
pen along. 
◆Raise the cap to 15% of current expenditures.
◆Require excess RDFs to be used for retiring
debt, funding capital and one-time projects, or cut-
ting taxes.